The National Association of Securities Dealers\u27 Arbitration of Investor Claims against Its Brokers: Taming the Fox that Guards the Henhouse by Foley, Paul Joseph
NORTH CAROLINA
BANKING INSTITUTE
Volume 7 | Issue 1 Article 14
2003
The National Association of Securities Dealers'
Arbitration of Investor Claims against Its Brokers:
Taming the Fox that Guards the Henhouse
Paul Joseph Foley
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Banking Institute by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Paul J. Foley, The National Association of Securities Dealers' Arbitration of Investor Claims against Its Brokers: Taming the Fox that Guards
the Henhouse, 7 N.C. Banking Inst. 239 (2003).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi/vol7/iss1/14
The National Association of Securities Dealers' Arbitration of
Investor Claims Against its Brokers: Taming the Fox that Guards
the Henhouse
Nearly eight trillion dollars in stock wealth evaporated
when the stock market boom of the 1990s met the bust of the early
2000s.' The bull market of the 1990s lasted so long that many who
had not previously invested in the stock market became
dissatisfied with modest but guaranteed bank returns and
attempted to join in the stock market's unprecedented prosperity.2
Just as there was an upswing in inexperienced investors, swarms of
inexperienced brokers jumped on board to service the new
business.3 Not only had these inexperienced investors and brokers
never seen a market downturn, but investors allege that their
brokers were not properly trained or adequately supervised.4
Unfortunately for these inexperienced investors and brokers alike,
they entered the market at the worst possible time, when it was at
or close to its all-time high.'
During the bull market, when investors' portfolios were
growing by leaps and bounds, investors often blindly trusted their
1. See Cindy Krischer Goodman, Many angry investors suing brokers: Attorneys
see increase in cases especially from elderly as $8 trillion in stock wealth evaporates,
CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Sept. 9, 2002, available at 2002 WL 25192208.
2. See Christine Dugas, Stung by losses, investors place blame on brokers. Many
say cash was put in high-risk stocks, then lost, USA TODAY, May 18, 2001, available at
2001 WL 5462815; see also Janice Revell, How Much Do Brokers Have to Hide?,
FORTUNE, May 13, 2002 (describing how many Americans poured money into the
stock market because they were dissatisfied with the modest returns that insured
bank products provide), available at 2002 WL 2190626.
3. See Dugas, supra note 2. The number of registered brokers jumped from
506,000 in 1995 to 672,489 in 2000, a thirty-three percent increase. See id.; see also
NASD, NASD Statistics, at http://www.nasdr.com/2380.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2003)
(indicating that the number of NASD licensed brokers increased rapidly during the
bull market of the 1990s).
4. See Dugas, supra note 2. See also, NASD, Dispute Resolution Statistics, at
http://www.nasdadr.com/statistics.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2003) (highlighting that, as
of Dec. 20, 2002, 2,625 investor claims in 2002 involved the failure to supervise in the
controversy).
5. NASD, Dispute Resolution Statistics, at http://www.nasdadr.com/statistics.asp
(last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
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brokers and brokerage firms.6 When investors suffered severe
losses, they placed much more scrutiny on their brokers and
brokerage firms' actions and began finger pointing. The
allegations behind the finger pointing seemed to be confirmed by
the recent string of Wall Street scandals.8 Most recently, Wall
Street brokerage firms reached a $1.4 billion settlement with
securities regulators over alleged conflicts of interest arising from
stock research analysts' fraudulent acts of touting stocks in order
to win investment-banking business.9 The discovery of these
scandals leaves little doubt that "the bull market masked many
sins."" In fact, for some brokers, research analysts, and brokerage
firms, the arrival of the bear market has marked their day of
reckoning."1
After sustaining heavy losses and with new Wall Street
scandals breaking daily, 2 many investors are now looking for a
way to recoup their stock market losses. 13  As a result, more
investors are filing complaints against their brokers and brokerage
firms than ever before.14 In fact, in just the first two months of
6. See id.
7. See Dugas, supra note 2.
8. Joshua Chaffin, Lawyers Agog as the Banks Spill IPO Beans, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 18, 2002, available at 2002 WL 100563554. Merrill Lynch and other investment
firms' stock analysts have been accused of recommending stocks in order to win
investment-banking business from the firms of the stocks they touted. Id.
Additionally, Goldman Sachs, Credit Suisse First Boston, and other investment
banks are under investigation for the ways in which they distributed IPO shares. Id.
The highly publicized accounting scandals, including those of Enron, Worldcom,
Global Crossing, and Tyco have left many investors questioning the integrity of Wall
Street and the regulatory organizations in charge of monitoring the industry. Id.
9. See Susanne Craig, Wall Street Braces for Bad-Research Claims, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 14, 2003, available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3956483. A private barrage of litigation has
been spurred by a recent $1.4 billion settlement Wall Street Firms made with
securities regulators. Id.
10. See Dugas, supra note 2 (quoting Indiana Securities Commissioner Brad
Skolnik).
11. See Craig, supra note 9.
12. See id.; Chaffin, supra note 8.
13. See Dugas, supra note 2; see also Heike Wipperfurth, Litigation jumps;
winning tougher: Number of settlements drops, investors' awards likely to be small,
CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., July 29, 2002, available at 2002 WL 9594014.
14. See Brenda L. Moore, More U.S. Investors Are Suing Their Brokers, But the
Odds of Winning Haven't Improved, THE WALL ST. J. EUR., June 20, 2002, available
at 2002 WL-WSJE 22215718; Craig, supra note 9. On Jan. 13, 2003 a single law firm
filed 100 arbitration claims against Citigroup in connection with Jack Grubman's
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2003 the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) could
receive nearly half the number of complaints that it received in all
of 2002.1' Investors who file complaints are often surprised to
learn that they will never see their day in court; instead, a
securities arbitration panel will resolve their dispute.16 The NASD
provides the primary arbitration forum in which investors resolve
their grievances against their brokers and brokerage firms. 7
The NASD is the largest Self Regulatory Organization
(SRO) in the world; all Wall Street brokerage firms and brokers
are required to be members. 8 The NASD is responsible for
protecting investors from wrongful acts of its members by
investigating, regulating, and disciplining its licensed brokers and
member brokerage firms. 9  The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) is responsible for the oversight of the NASD
as mandated by section 19 of the Securities Act of 1933.20 This
oversight includes the review of all NASD rule-making activity
and all NASD disciplinary actions.2' Further, the SEC has the
authority to proceed directly against the NASD in the event that
the NASD fails to adequately enforce its own rules.22
Despite SEC supervision, the NASD is relied upon for the
day-to-day policing of brokers and their firms.23 The NASD,
however, is the securities industry's trade group and its $400
million budget is funded entirely by securities firms and stock
alleged fraudulent research ratings on WorldCom Inc. Id. Another group of
plaintiffs' attorneys will soon file up to 2,000 arbitration claims against Salomon
Smith Barney and Merrill Lynch alleging that their analysts provided fraudulent
research to investors in order to promote investment-banking business. Id.
15. See Scott Cohn, Analysis: Flood of arbitration claims by investors, CNBC:
BUSINESS CENTER, Jan. 14, 2003, available at 2003 WL 6277198.
16. See Goodman, supra note 1.
17. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-00-115, Securities
Arbitration: Actions Needed to Address Problem of Unpaid Awards 24 (June 15,
2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/gg00115.pdf.
18. Noelle Knox & Barbara Hansen, Brokerage watchdog fights for credibility;
Conflicts of interest, lack of action cost NASD the faith of investors, USA TODAY,
May 24, 2002, available at 2002 WL 4726676.
19. Id.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2000).
21. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION §13.14 (4th ed.
2002).
22. See id.
23. See Revell, supra note 2.
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brokers. 24 As a result, the NASD is charged with the responsibility
of representing both its members and the investing public.25 Due
to this potential conflict, the NASD and, more particularly, its
arbitration program have received close examination from
regulators and investors. 26  As the securities regulators'
investigations of Wall Street scandals transition into investor
claims against their brokers and brokerage firms,27 the NASD's
arbitration program will likely be further scrutinized.
The potential conflicts of interest caused by the NASD's
dual role, of representing both its members and the investing
public, is a growing concern for Congress, the SEC, State
Legislatures, and investors alike.28 This Note explores the validity
of many investors' perceptions that their interests take a back seat
to the interests of NASD member firms in the NASD's resolution
of investor claims. The first section of this Note briefly discusses
the background and history of securities arbitration.29 The second
section highlights the narrowing differences between securities
arbitration and traditional litigation.3" The third section comments
on recent developments in securities arbitration and on whether
investors with successful claims are adequately compensated.3
Finally, the fourth section covers the perception of conflicts of
interest between the NASD and investors and how investors, their
lawyers, State Attorneys General and State Legislatures are
attempting to remedy the situation.32
I. SECURITIES ARBITRATION BACKGROUND
Arbitration has been used as a method of resolving
securities industry disputes for approximately 130 years.
24. See id.; Knox & Hansen, supra note 18.
25. See Revell, supra note 2.
26. See id.
27. See Craig, supra note 9.
28. See infra notes 33-186 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 33-54 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 55-117 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 118-141 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 142-186 and accompanying text.
33. DAVID A. LIPTON, BROKER DEALER REGULATION §4.1 (2002), BDREG APP
4.01.
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However, arbitration has only recently become the primary
mechanism for resolving securities industry disputes.34 In 1953, the
Supreme Court in Wilco v. Swan held that mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration agreements were not enforceable because such
agreements required investors to waive their statutory right to
resolve their disputes in a court of law.35 In 1987, however, the
Supreme Court validated the securities industry's use of
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements in Shearson/
American Express Inc. v. McMahon.36 In McMahon, the Court
stated that it upheld mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements
because the SEC has "expansive power to ensure the adequacy of
the arbitration procedures employed by the SROs [including the
NASD]. '37 Since McMahon, nearly all brokerage firms require
investors to sign a contract that includes a mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clause in order to open a brokerage account.38
Investors often open new investment accounts without realizing
that they have agreed to arbitrate future claims they may have
against their broker.39
As disputes arise with their brokers, investors have three
major options for securities arbitration forums.4 ° In 1989, the SEC
approved securities arbitration programs for the three major
SROs: the NASD, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and
34. Cheryl Nichols, Arbitrator Selection at the NASD: Investor Perception of a
Pro-Securities Industry Bias, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 63, 68-69 (1999).
35. See generally Wilco v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (pertaining only to investors'
rights under the Securities Act of 1933), overruled by Rodriquez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989).
36. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987)
(validating pre-dispute arbitration agreement claims brought under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934). By validating pre-dispute arbitration clauses used by
brokerage firms, McMahon effectively eliminated the use of the traditional court
system to resolve investor claims because most federal securities claims are based
upon the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Nichols, supra note 34, at 69. It was not
until 1989, when the Court decided Rodriquez de Quijas, that Swan, covering claims
brought under the Securities Act of 1933, was actually overruled. Id.
37. See Nichols, supra note 34, at 69.
38. See Marilyn Blumberg Cane & Marc J. Greenspon, Securities Arbitration:
Bankrupt, Bothered & Bewildered, 7 STAN. J. L., Bus. & FIN. 131,134 (2002); Knox &
Hansen, supra note 18.
39. See Cane & Greenspon, supra note 38, at 134.
40. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
§15.1[1] (4th ed. 2002).
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the American Exchange (AMEX).41  Following the SEC's
approval of the SRO arbitration programs, the NYSE, AMEX,
and the NASD each created arbitration programs to settle investor
claims.42 The SEC remains responsible for the oversight of these
securities arbitration forums. 3  To administer its arbitration
program, the NASD created a subsidiary, The National
Association of Securities Dealer Dispute Resolution, Inc. (NASD-
DR),' which was intended to provide an independent securities
arbitration forum separate and distinct from the NASD and its
members.45 The NASD-DR is the securities arbitration forum for
most investors, resolving over ninety-percent of individual
investors' claims against brokers and their firms.46
The first step in a NASD-DR arbitration is the filing of the
statement of claim with the NASD-DR.47 The relaxed nature of
arbitration does not require formal pleading; an informal letter
detailing the relevant facts and the remedies sought will suffice.48
The amount in controversy will determine whether one or three
arbitrators will hear the claim.49 Typically, unless the amount in
controversy is less than $50,000, three arbitrators will hear the
dispute.5" The hearing is less formal than a trial, but similarly
includes opening statements, direct and cross-examination of
witnesses, and closing statements.5' After the record is closed the
41. Id. at §15.3[2].
42. Id. at §15.1[1].
43. Id.
44. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 17, at 19-20.
45. See id; Moore, supra note 14.
46. See Moore, supra note 14. The NYSE handles the majority of the remaining
ten percent of securities arbitrations. Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making it Up as
They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOzO L. REV. 991,
991-92 (2002).
47. See John C. Anjier & George Denegre, Jr., Disputes between Customers and
Brokers/Brokerage Firms, 49 LA. B.J. 283, 285 (2002).
48. Id.; see also Code of Arbitration Procedure Rule 10314(a), N.A.S.D. Manual
(CCH) 7581 (Dec. 30, 2002) (describing what is required in the statement of claim)
[hereinafter NASD Manual].
49. See NASD Manual, supra note 48, at 7576 (Rule 10308(b)).
50. See generally id. (identifying how arbitration panels are composed and a
number of different objections that may allow the various participants to change the
composition of the panel).
51. See Anjier & Denegre, supra note 47.
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arbitrator(s) should render an award within thirty days.52 The
panel's award is typically final and is subject to appeal only under
limited circumstances.5 3 Unless the matter is under appeal, the
arbitration panel's award must be paid within thirty days of
receipt.54
II. SECURITIES ARBITRATION AND LITIGATION IN COURT: A
CONVERGING ROAD?
The original purpose of the SRO arbitration programs was
to provide a fast, efficient, and cost-effective means of resolving
securities disputes.55 Even today, the NASD-DR describes its
arbitration process as a quick and inexpensive substitute to judicial
litigation.56 In response to the perceived conflict of interest
created by the fact that the securities industry is the primary forum
for individual investors to resolve their disputes against securities
industry members, a number of changes have been made to the
NASD-DR arbitration format.57  These changes have made
securities arbitrations more complex, time-consuming, and costly.58
Despite the original intent and the NASD-DR's
description, NASD-DR arbitration resembles litigation more and
more every day.59 For example, new rules allow for expanded
discovery, 6° pre-hearing conferences, 61 a record of the hearing to
52. See NASD Manual, supra note 48, at 7587 (Rule 10330(d)).
53. See infra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
54. See NASD Manual, supra note 48, at 7588 (Rule 10330(h)).
55. See Black & Gross, supra note 46, at 998. "Arbitration generally has been
considered a simpler adjudicatory process than litigation because of its abbreviated
discovery procedures, the absence of a jury selection process, the limited availability
of appeal, and the less frequent resort to the use of motions." LIPTON, supra note 33,
at §4:2.
56. See Press Release, NASD Dispute Resolution, NASD Launches New Dispute
Resolution Subsidiary (July 17, 2000) (on file with the N.C. Banking Institute),
available at http://www.nasdr.com/news/pr2000/nesection00_160.html. "Financial
services companies say an informal arbitration system is a cheaper, simpler, faster
alternative to the courts." Allison Bell, NASD Seals Change in Arbitration Rule,
NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH-FINANCIAL SERVICES EDITION, Jan. 29, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 12411277.
57. See Black & Gross, supra note 46, at 1003.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 998.
60. See NASD Manual, supra note 48, at 7585-86 (Rule 10321) (detailing the
various methods of discovery available in NASD-DR arbitrations).
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be made,62 the publication of arbitration awards, 63 and an
arbitrator selection process. 64 Under the new arbitrator selection
process that went into effect on November 17, 1998, the parties to
the NASD-DR arbitration mutually select who will arbitrate their
claim.65 Prior to November 17, 1998, the securities industry chose
the arbitrators that heard suits against its members.66 In addition
to newly enacted rules and procedures, the SEC, in conjunction
with the NASD, has proposed a number of NASD-DR arbitration
rule changes, including the creation of a means for developing
arbitration precedent through arbitrator opinions.67
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and NASD-DR rules
do not require arbitrators to issue written opinions.68 Arbitration
opinions, much like those rendered in common law courts, could
provide much needed precedent for other arbitrators to use when
faced with similar claims.69 Perhaps, more importantly, requiring
arbitrators to provide the rationale behind awards would provide
brokers and investors with concrete evidence of the specific
conduct that constitutes a violation.7' Approximately seventy-
61. Id.
62. Id. at 7587 (Rule 10326).
63. Id. at 7588 (Rule 10330(f)).
64. Id. at 7574-79 (Rule 10308).
65. See General Accounting Office, supra note 17, at 19.
Under the new process, NASD supplies a list of up to 15 names
that are selected by computerized rotation of the arbitrator roster.
The parties can strike anyone from the list and rank the remaining
arbitrators according to their preferences. If the parties cannot
agree, they are assigned the next available arbitrator on the
computerized list to fill any remaining vacancies.
Id. See generally NASD Manual, supra note 48, at 7574-79 (Rule 10308) (detailing
the arbitrator selection process); Nichols, supra note 34, at 73 (outlining the
arbitrator selection process).
66. See Nichols, supra note 34, at 73.
67. See Black & Gross, supra note 46, at 998.
68. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2002); NASD Manual, supra note 48, at 7613 (Rule 10336);
Cane & Greenspon, supra note 38, at 146.
69. See Black & Gross, supra note 46, at 992. The vast majority of securities
claims are handled in arbitration and arbitration panels do not write opinions. Id.
Because of the lack of written opinions, the applicable securities law has been
somewhat "frozen." Id. Although the nature of the securities markets has changed
tremendously since McMahon, the courts have few opportunities to generate relevant
precedent. Id. Even when the courts do have such an opportunity their precedent
may or may not be followed by the arbitrators. Id.
70. See Cane & Greenspon, supra note 38, at 152.
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percent of broker-dealers "support federal legislation requiring
arbitrators of securities disputes to write a brief statement
explaining the reasons for their decisions."71  Investors also
welcome the prospect of requiring written opinions,72 but changes
of this nature make NASD-DR arbitration slower, less efficient,
and more costly.73
According to David S. Ruder, a former chairman of the
SEC and former member of the NASD Arbitration Policy Task
Force, "the increasingly litigious nature of securities arbitration
has gradually eroded the advantages of SRO arbitration."74 One
such frequently touted advantage of NASD-DR arbitration is the
speed in which disputes are resolved.75 In 1998, before the recent
increase in securities arbitration, the average NASD-DR
arbitration lasted nearly seventeen months.76 The NASD-DR
arbitration system is "already showing signs of stress" in
attempting to accommodate the recent record numbers of
71. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-92-74, Securities
Arbitration: How Investors Fair 53 (May 11, 1992), available at
http://161.203.16.4/d32t10/146692.pdf. Large firms responded differently; only two of
the nine questioned would support legislation requiring written statements. Id.
72. See id.
73. See Black & Gross, supra note 46, at 1003.
74. Id. at 1004. Several factors commonly cited as contributing to the litigious
nature of arbitration include: (1) the significant increase in motions relating to
discovery, eligibility, statutes of limitations, and other pre-hearing matters; (2) a
perceived increase in lawyering illustrated by extensive discovery requests,
stonewalling, and delay tactics; (3) frequent appeals to the courts to challenge the
eligibility of an arbitration claim or to raise a statute of limitations defense; (4) a
movement away from relaxed evidentiary and procedural standards common to
arbitration; and (5) much longer hearings, often in excess of the one or two days that
is expected for the resolution of investor claims. Id.
75. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
76. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 17, at 29, 32. In 1998, the
average time between an investor's claim being filed and an arbitration decision
being rendered was 519 days. Id. at 29. The average time it took to litigate the
fifteen individual securities claims included in the GAO report from the time of filing
the claim to final judgment was 930 days. Id. at 32. These numbers may be a bit
misleading because the 930 days includes only fifteen cases that actually made it to a
final court decision. Id. Because the vast majority of securities claims are arbitrated,
the GAO Report was unable to include a large number of litigated cases for
comparison purposes. Id.; see also Bill Deener, Report Ranks Brokerage Firms Based
on Number of Investor Complaints, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 29, 2002
(providing additional statistics regarding the duration of securities arbitrations),
available at 2002 WL 21527713.
20031
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arbitration claims.77 Also, proposed new rules, such as requiring
written opinions, would impose additional stress on the system and
substantially increase the duration of NASD-DR arbitrations.78
Further, the recent $1.4 billion settlement may make matters even
worse because, as part of the settlement, regulators will release the
evidence they uncovered during their investigations.79 This new
evidence may expose numerous additional scandals of which the
public is currently unaware.8" A likely result of this information
release will be a surge in arbitration claims filed with the NASD-
DR.8 The potential flood of complaints combined with the
proposed new rules could further erode the efficiency of NASD-
DR arbitration.82
While NASD-DR arbitrations are beginning to resemble
litigation in courts of law, one surprising place of divergence is in
the application of the law.83 In deciding McMahan, the Supreme
Court assumed that arbitrators would apply the law in resolving
arbitrational disputes.84 However, there is mounting evidence that
arbitrators do not reference the applicable law in their
deliberations. Even if NASD-DR arbitrators attempt to apply
the law, they often do not have securities or legal backgrounds and
receive little training on the complexities of securities law. 86
According to Linda Fienberg, president of NASD Dispute
Resolution, the NASD-DR has "purposely sought a panel that is
not professional and not primarily securities lawyers" because
77. See Cohn, supra note 15.
78. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 17, at 32.
79. See Cohn, supra note 15.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See id.; Black & Gross, supra note 46, at 1003-1004.
83. See Black & Gross, supra note 46, at 992.
84. Id.; Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 268 (1987).
85. See Black & Gross, supra note 46, at 992 (giving some clear examples of
arbitration decisions going against the law).
86. Id. NASD-DR selects its arbitrators from a broad cross-section of people,
diverse in culture, profession, and background. NASD, Become an Arbitrator, at
http://www.nasdadr.com/arb brochure-htm.asp (last modified Feb. 4, 2003). The
only requirements to become a NASD-DR arbitrator are that candidates must have
five years of full-time business or professional experience, pass the application




most respondents want their arbitration panel to resemble a jury,
rather than a judge.87 In fact, in order to combat the perception of
a pro-industry bias, the NASD-DR requires that arbitrations
involving investors must be heard by a panel that is made up of a
majority of arbitrators with backgrounds unrelated to the
securities industry unless the parties to the arbitration agree
otherwise.8" Often, and even when the applicable law is clear,
arbitrators arrive at results that are contrary to the law.8 9
However, the lack of written opinions leaves no record to review
the arbitrator(s) legal reasoning.9°
The parties have the ability to appeal the decision of their
arbitration panel, but judicial review of NASD-DR arbitration
panel decisions is "limited and highly deferential. '" 91 The FAA
provides a statutory limit to judicial review of NASD-DR
arbitration awards,92 but courts have indicated that there may be
additional grounds on which arbitration awards could be vacated
87. Carol X. Vinzant, Law & Order: Client-Broker Disputes, REGISTERED
REPRESENTATIVE, Nov. 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL 9674257.
88. See NASD, Become an Arbitrator, supra note 86. NASD-DR arbitrations are
decided by one or three arbitrators depending on the size of the dispute. NASD,
Arbitration Procedures, at http://www.nasdadr.com/arb-procedures.asp#who (last
modified Mar. 5, 2001).
89. See Black & Gross, supra note 46, at 992.
90. Id.
91. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 359 v. Madison Indus. Inc.,
84 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir. 1996).
92. WMA Sec. Inc. v. Wynn, 32 Fed. Appx. 726, 730 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that
the FAA limits judicial review of arbitration awards). See generally 9 U.S.C. § 10
(enumerating the statutory circumstances under which an arbitration award may be
modified or corrected).
In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the
district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating
the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration-(1)
where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means; (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty
of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient
cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material
to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights
of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.
2003]
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or corrected. 93  Courts rarely reverse NASD-DR arbitration
awards "even in the face of erroneous interpretations of the law."94
A NASD-.DR arbitration award will be set aside "only in very
unusual circumstances such as fraud, corruption, or a decision in
manifest disregard of the law., 95 For an award to be in "manifest
disregard of the law," the governing law must be "well defined,
explicit, and clearly applicable," and the error must be "obvious
and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the
average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator.,
96
Without written explanations of awards, the standard of
review applied by the courts has no practical application because it
is nearly impossible to determine the legal reasoning of the
arbitrator(s).97 In fact, NASD-DR arbitrators are instructed not to
provide the reasons for their decision because they are considered
invitations to judicial review.98 Often the only real question that
courts may review is whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the
dispute in the first place. 99  Despite the fact that there is no
mechanism in place to ensure that NASD-DR arbitrators adhere
to the applicable statutory law, they are often the first and only
decision maker in securities arbitrations."'
The lack of strict adherence to statutory law in NASD-DR
arbitrations may work to the investors' advantage.'' While
93. See Cane & Greenspon, supra note 38, at 148.
94. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 1401, 1402 (9th Cir.
1992).
95. Kelly v. Michaels, 59 F.3d 1050, 1053 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting First Options
of Chicago, Inc. v. Manuel, Kaplan, Etux, & MK Inv., Inc., 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995));
see, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 10 (stating that awards "procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means," or when the arbitrator exceeded his powers, may be set aside); see also
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (holding that the parties are bound by
arbitrator's decision not in "manifest disregard" of the law), overruled on other
grounds, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989).
96. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34
(2d Cir. 1986).
97. See Cane & Greenspon, supra note 38, at 151.
98. See id. at 159.
99. See Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 359, 84 F.3d at 1190.
"Ordinarily, state contract law will control whether the parties have in fact agreed to
submit the controversy to arbitration." HAZEN, supra note 40, at §15.2.
100. See Black & Gross, supra note 46, at 1031.
101. Id. at 1039.
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brokers' defenses are typically stronger on the law, customer
complaints are typically stronger on principles of equity, such as
hardship and betrayal. 112 According to a prominently placed quote
at the beginning of the arbitrator's manual given to all NASD-DR
arbitrators, "[e]quity is justice in that it goes beyond the written
law.... [I]t is equitable to prefer arbitration to the law court, for
the arbitrator keeps equity in view, whereas the judge looks only
to the law, and the reason why arbitrators were appointed was that
equity might prevail."'0 3  Principles of equity and fairness are
frequently applied in arbitrations, whereas such principles are not
usually taken into account for investors in courts of law."° In most
instances, the applicable securities law is unfavorable to the
investor.0 5 The application of equity in NASD-DR cases can
work to an investor's advantage by allowing arbitrators to award
them partial damages, as opposed to a court of law where the same
claimant would receive nothing.
1 °6
An additional benefit of arbitration to investors is that the
less stringent arbitration rules do not present many of the harsh
obstacles investors face when attempting to pursue a judicial
remedy.0 7 A major complication investors face in bringing
securities litigation claims is the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).' °8 The PSLRA codified stringent
pleading requirements for securities fraud claims.0 9 Under the
PSLRA, in order to plead securities fraud the plaintiff must "state
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
102. Id.
103. SECS. INDUS. CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, THE ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL 2
(2001) (quoting Domke on Aristotle), available at http://www.nasdadr.com/pdf-
text/arbmanual.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2003) [hereinafter ARBITRATOR'S
MANUAL]; see also Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Beyond Precedent
Arbitral Extensions of Securities Law, 57 Bus. LAW. 999, 1002 (May 2002) (noting
that all NASD-DR arbitrators receive the manual).
104. See ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 103; Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra
note 103, at 999-1000, 1017.
105. See Black & Gross, supra note 46, at 1036-40.
106. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 103, at 1002.
107. See generally HAZEN, supra note 40, at §12.12 (describing the federal court
requirements under PSLRA).
108. 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(2) (2000).
109. Id.; see also HAZEN, supra note 40, at §12.13 (describing the federal court
requirements under PSLRA).
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defendant acted with the required state of mind.""'  Requiring
investor plaintiffs to plead fraud allegations with specificity in
order to survive a motion to dismiss can cripple an investor's claim
before the investor has a chance to prove his case.'
In litigation, even when investors timely file and survive a
motion to dismiss, they still face the substantial risk of having their
claims summarily dismissed."12  According to the General
Accounting Office (GAO), approximately 70% of securities
related court cases included in their study were dismissed.' Only
12% of these securities cases were decided in court, of which
investors won about 73%.' The massive expenses incurred by
investors who are able to reach trial are often in the hundreds of
thousands of dollars and can consume entire awards." 5 Investor
success rates in securities litigation are a far cry from the success
investors enjoy when they arbitrate their claims through the
NASD-DR."6 Given these statistics, many wonder why broker-
dealers lobbied so hard for securities arbitration forums in the first
place.'
110. See HAZEN, supra note 40, at §12.13.
111. See Black & Gross, supra note 46, at 1036-37.
112. Id. at 1037; GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 17, at 7.
113. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 17, at 7. The GAO
investigated 121 federal court securities cases involving disputes between investors
and their broker-dealers in five different districts. Id. Of the 121 disputes, the court
decided 15, the parties settled 22, and 85 were dismissed. Id. The dismissed cases
were dismissed for various reasons, including being remanded to arbitration or being
transferred to a different district. Id.
114. Id. The parties settled the remaining eighteen percent of the cases. Id.
115. See Jerry W. Markham & Thomas Lee Hazen, Arbitration Before the
NASD-Fair or Biased-You Decide 8 (Jan. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the N.C. Banking Institute). Court cases are more expensive to adjudicate than
arbitrations because of expansive discovery, numerous motions, and judicial
formalities. Id.
116. See infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
117. See Black & Gross, supra note 46, at 1039.
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III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NASD-DR ARBITRATIONS:
ARE INVESTORS WITH SUCCESSFUL CLAIMS BEING
ADEQUATELY COMPENSATED?
In 2001, the number of NASD-DR arbitration claims filed
increased by 24% from 2000."' Filings in 2002 surpassed the
record number of claims filed in 2001 by 11%.119 In 2003, the
upward trend will likely continue as thousands of new claims are
filed in response to recent Wall Street settlements, and as
securities regulators release the findings of their investigations that
led to the settlements.12 0 After the release of the findings, investor
anger will likely boil over, translating into a substantial increase in
the number of arbitration claims filed with the NASD-DR in
2003.121
With the number of claims rising and bottom lines
shrinking due to the bear market, brokers and their firms are
defending themselves against investors' claims more vigorously
than ever.122 In 2002, the percentage of claims settled fell to 37%
as compared to 44% in 2001,123 far lower than the 60% settlement
levels seen in the 1990s. 124 Of the claims that proceeded through
arbitration, NASD-DR arbitration panels awarded investors
compensation between 53% and 61% of the time in each of the
past five years. 125 Although the investor wins more often than not,
the arbitration awards generally fall far short of the actual losses
sustained.
26
Under NASD-DR arbitration, investors with successful
claims are not likely to walk away with a significant percentage of
118. See NASD, Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 4.
119. Id. In 2002, investors filed 7,704 NASD-DR arbitration claims, an eleven
percent increase over the 6,915 claims filed in 2001. Id.
120. See Craig, supra note 9; supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
121. See Cohn, supra note 15.
122. See Wipperfurth, supra note 13.
123. See NASD, Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 4; see also Wipperfurth,
supra note 13 (supporting the assertion that brokerage firms are fighting back against
investor claims harder than ever).
124. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 17, at 24.
125. See Moore, supra note 14.
126. See id.
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their market losses, which often exceed one million dollars.'27 In
2001, NASD-DR arbitration panels awarded a total of $112
million. 28  Typical investor claims range from $200 to $23.5
million. 2 9  The median NASD-DR arbitration award was
$31,000,130 whereas the median investor claim was $64,000.131
NASD-DR arbitrators award more than half of the amount
investors claim in only 37% of the cases. 132 This data suggests that
arbitration panels are "splitting the baby" and applying equity
principals in order to provide investors with partial awards that
they would not be so fortunate to receive in courts of law.1 33 In
addition to the small percentage of their claim that investors
typically receive when they are successful in procuring an award,
lawyers' contingency fees often consume 40% of the ultimate
recovery. 34 If an investor is successful and procures a $50,000
award, she can expect to wind up taking home less than $10,000
after paying arbitration expenses.
13 5
The problem of adequate compensation for investors with
successful claims is further complicated by the fact that investment
firms often do not pay the judgments against them.136 According
127. See Wipperfurth, supra note 13.
128. See Moore, supra note 14.
129. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 17, at 28 (reporting the range
of investor claims in 1998).
130. See Wipperfurth, supra note 13 (reporting the average arbitration award in
2001).
131. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 17, at 28 (reporting the
average investor claim in 1998).
132. Id. at 26.
133. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text; Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra
note 103, at 1017 (describing "splitting the baby" as awarding claimants a portion of
their damage demands even when a court would likely award the same claimants
nothing).
134. See Goodman, supra note 1. The average contingency rate for personal
injury is 25%, while the average contingency rate for a NASD-DR arbitration is 40%.
Id. So many investors are attempting to pursue securities claims that attorneys
specializing in NASD-DR arbitrations enjoy the luxury of being extremely selective
with the cases that they choose to accept and will often turn away promising claims
that are less than $100,000. Id. Investors represented by attorneys are 27% more
likely to receive an award. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 17, at 26.
135. See Martin Paskind, Dealing with Claims Against Brokers, ALBUQUERQUE J.,
Nov. 4, 2002, available at 2002 WL 101903311. Parties to arbitrations must
compensate their arbitrators, expert witnesses, accountants, and lawyers. Id.
136. See Bell, supra note 56.
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to a study by the GAO, securities firms and brokers pay NASD-
DR awards less than half of the time. 137 The NASD reviewed why
so few arbitration awards were being paid and found that 90% of
the claims involved firms that had dropped out or had been forced
to leave the NASD.'38 Additionally, most of these firms were
insolvent, making collection difficult regardless of the forum in
which the judgment was rendered. 139  "Not surprisingly, many
plaintiffs' attorneys are requiring claimants to pay them on an
hourly basis, as opposed to more manageable contingency fees."
140
The high percentage of unpaid NASD-DR arbitration awards,
combined with the fact that the awards for successful claims often
fall far short of the claimed amount, creates many problems for
investors and raises questions about the NASD-DR arbitration
process and the securities industry's role in the settlement of
investor claims.
141
IV. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE NASD: WHAT IS BEING
DONE TO PROTECT INVESTORS?
While the conflicts of interest surrounding both the Enron
accounting scandal and Wall Street analysts' fraudulent stock
recommendations have garnered a great deal of attention recently,
the potential conflict of interest between the NASD and the
137. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 17, at 26. Current NASD
rules allow investors to take their claims against defunct brokerage firms to court.
Press Release, NASD, NASD Streamlines Arbitration Process for Claimants Filing
Against Defaulting Suspended or Terminated Industry Respondents (Sept. 19, 2002)
(on file with the N.C. Banking Institute), available at http://www.nasdr.com/news/pr
2002/release_02_043.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2003). Since October 14, 2002,
investors with claims against defunct brokerage firms may arbitrate their claims with
the NASD through a streamlined procedure. See id. Under this system, a hearing is
not conducted. Id. Instead a verdict is rendered by a single arbitrator based upon
the Statement of Claim and supporting documentation provided by the claimant. Id.
If there is an arbitration award, the claimant can take the award to court for
enforcement. Id. This system provides an inexpensive means of getting an
enforceable award against a brokerage firm that has been terminated by the NASD
or is defunct. Id.
138. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 17, at 70.
139. See id. at 33.
140. Cane & Greenspon, supra note 38, at 138. But see supra note 134 and
accompanying text (stating that the 40% contingency fee lawyers typically require for
NASD-DR arbitrations is relatively high).
141. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text; Wipperfurth, supra note 13.
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brokerage industry has slipped under the radar.'42 The NASD is
financially dependent on the same institutions and people it is
responsible for regulating and disciplining.143 This financial
dependence significantly detracts from the NASD's credibility
with the public.' Congress, the SEC, state regulators, and many
investors have expressed concern regarding the fairness and
impartiality of maintaining arbitration forums that are sponsored
and administered by the securities industry.
14 5
Much of the public perceives that the NASD is hesitant to
punish its rule-breaking members, thus failing to adequately
protect investors.'46 This perception is bolstered by the fact that
the NASD did not take immediate disciplinary action against firms
or research analysts for making fraudulent stock recommendations
in order to win investment-banking business. 4 7 As a result of the
NASD's hesitation to act against its members, New York Attorney
General, Eliot Spitzer, conducted his own investigation of the
biased research ratings, stating, "[t]he self-regulatory organizations
that are supposed to be there to protect (investors) have failed,
and I'm not waiting any longer for them to act."' 148 Merrill Lynch,
the first target of Spitzer's investigation, settled with New York
State. 149 In that settlement, Merrill Lynch agreed to pay a $100
million fine and stop compensating its stock analysts based on the
amount of investment banking revenue they generate, but rather
on the performance of the analysts' recommendations. 50 In
response to Merrill Lynch's settlement with New York, the NASD
142. See Knox & Hansen, supra note 18.
143. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
144. See Knox & Hansen, supra note 18.
145. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 17, at 4; see also Nichols,
supra note 34, at 64 (stating that "both investors and Congress have expressed
concern about the fairness of securities industry-sponsored and administered arbitral
forums").
146. See Knox & Hansen, supra note 18.
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. See id. Elliot Spitzer is currently conducting investigations of at least five
other investment banks for touting stocks in order to gain investment banking
business. See id. In addition to the $100 million Merrill Lynch settlement, other Wall
Street firms have recently reached a $1.4 billion settlement with securities regulators
for similar actions. Craig, supra note 9.
150. See Knox & Hansen, supra note 18.
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has proposed new rules to curb potential conflicts of interest
between research analysts' recommendations and investment
banking revenue.151 Although the NASD eventually took action,
the NASD's after-the-fact response may have detracted from its
already damaged credibility.
15 2
The investing public relies on the NASD to monitor,
regulate, and investigate complaints against its 662,311 registered
brokers and 5,392 member brokerage firms. 153 In 2002, the NASD
received 4,495 customer complaints, 154 a 32% decrease from 6,584
in 2000.155 The decline in customer complaints between 2000 and
2002, the same period when customers were filing record numbers
of arbitration claims with the NASD-DR against brokers and
firms, is counter-intuitive. 156 The likely reason that many investors
filed arbitration claims with the NASD-DR without complaining
to the NASD is because most NASD investigations end with a no-
action letter. 15 7 The no-action letter informs the investor that the
NASD is closing its investigation without taking any disciplinary
action against the broker and/or firm in question. 158  Lawyers
representing investors in NASD-DR arbitrations view NASD no-
action letters as the "kiss of death" to their arbitration claims
because NASD-DR arbitration panels typically follow the NASD's
lead, and thus they opt to skip the NASD complaint process and
avoid the possibility of receiving the letter. 59  The NASD has
recently changed its policy to give the complaining investor the
151. See Self-Regulatory Organizations: Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule
Changes, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47110, 68 Fed. Reg. 826 (proposed Dec. 31,
2002) (filing with the SEC of proposed rule changes by the NASD relating to
research analyst conflicts of interest), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-
47110.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2003). NASD has submitted proposed changes to
Rules 1050, 1120, and 2711. Id. The NASD must submit proposed rule changes to
the SEC for approval. Black & Gross, supra note 46, at 998.
152. See supra notes 144, 146 and accompanying text.
153. See NASD, Statistics, supra note 3 (providing updated data current as of
January 13, 2003).
154. Id.
155. Id. The NASD received 5,155 customer complaints in 2001. Id.
156. Id.
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option to not receive a no-action letter. 16' Thus, this change, which
allows investors to avoid the no-action letter, may increase
customer complaints to the NASD.
1 61
Although the NASD changed its no-action letter policy, it
did not change the way customer complaints are investigated and
resolved.1 62  In 2002, the NASD received 4,495 customer
complaints and suspended or expelled 814 brokers and 10 firms.
1 63
Because the NASD takes disciplinary action against its members
less than 20% of the time, investors and their attorneys question
whether the NASD properly investigates or resolves customer
complaints."64 Consequently, many investors feel that reporting
inappropriate broker conduct to the NASD will do nothing more
than hurt their NASD-DR arbitration claim.
65
Investors and their lawyers are not alone in their failure to
report broker misconduct to the NASD.166 With record numbers
of arbitration claims being filed with the NASD-DR and investors
obtaining relief in a majority of them, critics question why the
NASD is not sanctioning more brokers and firms. 167 Currently, no
effective mechanism exists for NASD-DR arbitrators to report
broker misconduct back to the NASD. 16' NASD-DR arbitration
panels rarely report even the most outrageous cases of broker
misconduct to the NASD.1 69  According to Philip Aidikoff,
President of the Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association,
"after the money is paid in a settlement or award, these guys [the
160. Id. On May 23, 2002, "the NASD's board of directors voted to change the
working of the no-action letter it sends to investors when it closes an investigation
and, more important[ly], will give investors the choice of whether the NASD sends a
letter at all." Id. The Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association has been trying
for years to change the NASD no-action letter policy. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See NASD, Statistics, supra note 3. This is the total number of NASD
suspensions and expulsions and are not actions taken solely in response from
customer complaints. Id.
164. See id.; Knox & Hansen, supra note 18.
165. Knox & Hansen, supra note 18. (according to Pat Sadler, a lawyer in Georgia,







brokers] are still in the business, they're still doing the same
thing-and that's frightening."170 Even Mary Schapiro, president
of the NASD's regulatory division and a former SEC
Commissioner, agreed that there is a need to better educate
NASD-DR arbitrators to report egregious conduct to the
NASD. 17' The NASD-DR's failure to report broker misconduct to
the NASD, combined with the NASD's frequent failure to take
action even when misconduct is reported, further call the NASD
and NASD-DR's allegiances into question."7
The California Legislature recently opined on the question
of arbitrators' allegiances by passing Senate Bill 475.173 While not
directly targeting the securities industry, this amendment to the
California Code of Civil Procedure is intended to build public
confidence in the arbitration process.'74 Senate Bill 475, which
went into effect July 1, 2002, requires arbitrators to disclose much
more information pertaining to potential conflicts of interest.
175
Under the amendment, arbitrators are required to disclose
significant personal relationships they might have with parties to
the arbitration or to lawyers on either side, as well as potential
conflicts their extended family members may have with the
parties. 176  California now requires more detailed arbitrator
disclosure than is required under NASD-DR rules.1 7 Further, the




173. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §1281.85 (2002). See generally Don Bauder,
Dispute Delays New Securities Arbitrations, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 16,
2002, available at 2002 WL 4614237 (discussing the dispute over the bill between the
California Legislature and the NASD).
174. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1281.85.
175. Id.
176. See id.; Bauder, supra note 173 Depending of the size of the claim, the
arbitration panel is typically made up of three individuals, one industry insider and
two people from the public that are considered outsiders. Id. "There are often
questions about those purported outsiders." Id. In many cases, the public arbitrator
is someone with a connection to the securities industry, such as a former broker or
lawyer who provides advice to brokerage houses. Id.
177. Michael A. Perino, Report to the Securities and Exchange Commission
Regarding Arbitrator Conflict Disclosure Requirements in NASD and NYSE
Securities Arbitrations 1, Nov. 4, 2002, available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/
arbconflict.pdf.
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disclosure of a broad array of information and requires courts to
vacate arbitral awards if the arbitrator failed to make a required
disclosure."' 78  As a result, a number of NASD-DR arbitrators
pulled out of pending arbitrations and the NASD refused to
appoint any new arbitrators in California, bringing arbitrations
there to a halt.
179
The NYSE and NASD filed suit in federal district court in
Oakland seeking a declaratory judgment that California law
cannot be applied to their national, federally-regulated arbitration
procedures. 8 ° The district court judge dismissed the suit, but the
decision is likely to be appealed; the NYSE and NASD-DR are
currently "weighing their options."'' The securities industry feels
that their arbitrators already meet strict disclosure rules and that
the California rules are unnecessary and unduly burdensome.'82
California officials and investors felt differently, believing the
NASD-DR's challenge of a law that would lend much needed
credibility to their arbitrations is sending the wrong message to the
public.'83 Many believe that calling for less disclosure when the
public is demanding more detracts further from the NASD-DR's
tarnished public image."' A dangerous precedent is at stake for
178. Id.
179. See Bauder, supra note 173. The fact that some NASD-DR arbitrators pulled
out of arbitrations after this act was put into place caused many to wonder why they
left. Id.
180. See Perino, supra note 177, at 2.
181. See NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. v. Judicial Council of California, 232 F.
Supp. 2d 1055, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Susanne Craig, Judge Throws Out Arbitrator
Case, THE WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2002, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3411660. The case
was dismissed because the Judicial Council of California and the individual members
of the council were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment that provides
"a general bar against suing a state in federal court." NASD Dispute Resolution,
Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d at 1059.
182. See Bauder, supra note 173; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities &
Exchange Commission, NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. & New York Stock
Exchange, Inc., v. Judicial Council of California, et al., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (2002)
(stating the SEC's support of the NASD's position), available at
http:/www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/nasddispute.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2003)
[hereinafter SEC Brief]. The NYSE joined the NASD in the suit. Id. The SEC's
legal brief was filed with the court on September 24, 2002. Id.
183. See E. Scott Reckard, California Arbitration Halt Frustrates Investors
Securities, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2504349; JB, SEC
Arbitrator Disclosure Report Draws SROs' Praise While Attorneys Say it Sends
Wrong Message, SEC. WEEK, Nov. 18, 2002, available at 2002 WL 13599629.
184. See JB, supra note 183.
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the NASD-DR because if the California legislature is ultimately
allowed to impose its own rules on securities arbitrations, other
state legislatures would be allowed to make their own rules as
well. 85 The final decision on this issue will be significant because
the possibility of different rules in each state could completely
undermine the federally regulated national arbitration programs
currently in place.186
V. CONCLUSION
While a number of problems remain with the NASD's self-
regulation of the securities industry and the NASD-DR's
resolution of investor complaints, the proverbial fox, does not run
unrestrained. The NASD-DR's role in the resolution of investor
complaints will take center stage as the current Wall Street scandal
investigations transition into unprecedented numbers of investor
arbitration claims.187 When this occurs, it will likely be found that
despite the investor perception of a pro-industry bias, investors
fare much better in NASD-DR arbitrations than they would in
courts of law. 88  The statistics show that the NASD-DR
arbitration process overwhelmingly favors investors, while
traditional litigation seemingly favors the securities industry. 89
Further, the SEC and the NASD work in conjunction to fix the
problems with the regulation and resolution of investor complaints
as they arise. 9° The NASD frequently proposes new rules to deal
with problems, 9 ' but change is often slow because new rules must
be approved by the SEC.192 Unfortunately, the new rules designed
to promote fairness come at the expense of efficiency.'93
185. See SEC Brief, supra note 182.
186. Id.
187. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 106, 113-16, 123-25, 133 and accompanying text.
189. LIPTON, supra note 33, at §4:2. "Arbitration generally has been considered a
simpler adjudicatory process than litigation because of its abbreviated discovery
procedures, the absence of a jury selection process, the limited availability of appeal,
and the less frequent resort to the use of motions." Id.
190. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
191. Id.
192. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
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Efficiency is, after all, the reason why litigation has been replaced
by arbitration in the securities industry. 9 4 While not perfect,
current NASD-DR arbitration procedures go to great lengths in
attempting to maintain a delicate balance between fairness and
efficiency.
NASD-DR arbitrations, unlike litigation, remain true to
their original purpose of providing a faster, more efficient, and
cost-effective means of resolving securities disputes.'95 At the
same time, NASD-DR arbitrations seemingly favor investors, not
the securities industry.'96 If the NASD is a fox watching the
henhouse of investors, Congress, the SEC, state officials, and
investor advocates provide formidable restraints that prevent the
fox from taking advantage of the situation and leave him, instead,
licking his chops.
PAUL JOSEPH FOLEY
194. See supra notes 55 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. But see supra note 74 and
accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 113-16, 123-25 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 7
